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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
WANDA MARIE SACKETT BAGSHAW,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.

:
:

Case No. 880647-CA

:

JOSEPH ARTHUR BAGSHAW

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Priority Classification
No. 14b

:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

Jurisdiction
The Jurisdiction of the Court is invoked under Utah Constitution,
Article VIII, § 5; and § 78-2A-3(2)(h) of the Utah Code Annotated
(1953) as amended.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a Judgment for unpaid alimony arrearages
in favor of Respondent Wanda Marie Sackett Bagshaw entered on
said Respondent's Order to Show Cause against Appellant Joseph
Arthur Bagshaw on September 20, 1988 by the Honorable J. Dennis
Frederick, Judge, Third District Court.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Does Appellantfs assertion of the facts in this matter,

even in the most favorable light to Appellant, give the Court
below good cause to enter a Nunc Pro Tunc Order modifying the
-1-

Decree of Divorce in this matter pursuant to the statutory provisions
of § 30-4a-l of the Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended, and
as interpreted by this Court in H o m e v. H o m e , 737 P. 2d 244
(Utah App. 1987)?
2.

Was the Court below correct in its application of the

legal precedence set forth in Brown v. Brown, 744 P.2d 333 (Utah
App. 1987) to the facts in this matter?
3.

Should the Court award costs and attorney's fees to

Respondent incurred in the response to this appeal?

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The statutes relevant to the determination of this case
include § 25-5-4 and § 30-4a-l, Utah Code Annotated (1953), as
amended.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Nature of the Case.

This is an action that was commenced

by Respondent to recover alimony arrearages that were due and
owing pursuant to a divorce decree entered in this matter on
January 10, 1973.

2.

Course of Proceedings.

Upon Respondent's order to show

cause, The Court below awarded $19,400 to Respondent in September
1988, ruling inter alia that there was no reason to terminate
alimony by reasons of the actions of Respondent and that the
alimony awarded to Respondent remained in full force and effect
-2-

from the time of its entry to the present, and has not been
terminated by the Appellant by prior order of the Court.

Appellant

consequently brought this appeal.
3.

Disposition at Trial Court.

After finding that Respondent

had done nothing that would justify termination of alimony pursuant
to the decree; that there was no enforceable agreement between
the parties modifying the Decree to eliminate alimony; and there
being no finding of the Court for good cause to make a nunc pro
tunc order to modify such decree, Respondent was awarded judgment
in the amount of $19,400.

Each party was ordered to pay their

own costs and attorney's fees.

RELEVANT FACTS
The parties to this action were married June 7, 1958

and

had 2 children born of issue to the marriage (Record, Page 129).
The Appellant had what he described as a 9th grade education
(Id.) and during the course of his relationship with the Respondent
before and during the marriage, he corresponded with her by
letter while in the military, he maintained a subscription to
Outdoor Life, he read proclamations, and he signed papers when
items were purchased (Wanda Bagshaw Testimony, Page 21 - Addendum
Exhibit "B").
On April 7, 1972 Respondent filed a Divorce Complaint (Record,
Page 2), and on December 3, 1972, Appellant made his entry of
appearance and waived his time to plead or otherwise answer,
signing such appearance and waiver above his printed name (Record,
-3-

Page 7 - Addendum Exhibit "C") and where no marks were apparent
that would indicate someone had marked it or told him where to
sign, as Appellant testified at trial (Record, Page 115 - Addendum
Exhibit "D").

On January 10, 1973 the Decree of Divorce was

entered in this matter, granting Respondent inter alia $100 per
month per child for child support, and $200 per month as alimony
(Record, Page 12), as had been prayed for in the Complaint filed
in April 1972 (Record, Page 2-3) which was delivered to Appellant
on December 3, 1972 (Record, Page 7).
On May 17, 1973, Appellant brought an Order to Show Cause
based on his allegation that he could not read, and that Respondent
had misrepresented to him that no alimony would in the decree
(Record, Page 14). The Order to Show Cause was noticed for July
27, 1973 (Record, Page 17) and then stricken on the date of the
hearing with Appellant's counsel present in Court (Record, Page
18).

In the meantime, Respondent brought her own Order to Show

Cause to enforce the payments under the decree, which was signed
June 20, 1973, but not filed until November 2, 1973 (Record, Page
19-20).

Appellant re-noticed his Order to Show Cause, and the

matter came before the Court on November 28, 1973.
On the day prior to the November 28, 1973 hearing, Appellant
called the Respondent on the telephone and made threats against
her life (Record, Pages 105-107).

The Respondent appeared at the

Courthouse the following day but refused to take part in the
proceedings because of the death threats (Record, Page 106 and
Wanda Bagshaw Testimony, Page 16 - Addendum Exhibit "E").
-4-

Although

no evidentiary hearing was conducted, counsel for both parties,
together with Appellant and his second wife, retired to conference
room at the Courthouse to discuss the matter (Record, Page 108).
What happened in the meeting at the Courthouse on November
28, 1973 constitutes the basis of Appellant's position in this
appeal, and is the crux of most issues now before this Court.
According to the Appellant, he, his wife, and his attorney
met with counsel for the Respondent (Record, Page 108 & 119); and
an agreement was worked out where Respondent would agree to
terminate alimony if the Appellant dropped his charges against
Respondent for allegedly stealing his jeep and a federal income
tax return (Record, Page 109 & 119). Appellant further alleges
that Respondent agreed to the stipulation in a phone conversation
that was placed to her by her attorney from the conference room
(Record, Page 109 & 120).
It is undisputed that Respondent was not at the Courthouse
meeting on November 28, 1973.

Respondent further alleges that

she did not receive a call from her attorney while he was at the
Courthouse (Exhibit "E"), and further, that she never authorized
her attorney to enter into an agreement waiving her right to
alimony (Wanda Bagshaw Testimony, Page 21 - Addendum Exhibit "B").
Neither attorney who participated in the Courthouse meeting
on November 28, 1973 has any recollection of the meeting, or any
stipulation between the parties (Record Pages 106-115).

Further,

the minute entry for November 28,1973 does not reflect any stipulation
having been entered on the record, it does not reflect any testimony
-5-

from either party.

When viewed together with the testimony of

Appellant's wife (Record, Page 108), it appears that after suggesting
that counsel meet and attempt to work out the differences between
the parties, an entry was made that continued the Order to Show
Cause hearing in anticipation of a stipulation and order that
might be forthcoming (Record, Page 23). There is no testimony,
nor does the minute entry of November 28, 1973 reflect, that
counsel went before the Court after the meeting and announced a
stipulation had been reached.
From the date of the meeting until an Order to Show Cause
was brought to collect alimony arrearages in February 1988,
Appellant asserts that he thought the issue of alimony had been
resolved, even though papers were never drawn, signed or delivered
to him reflecting the stipulation as he understood it to be
(Record, Page 120-121).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Court below was correct in determining that good cause
did not exist for the Court to make a nunc pro tunc order modifying
the divorce decree to eliminate alimony because an enforceable
agreement to modify the decree had not been arrived at between
the parties.
ARGUMENT
POINT NO. I; GOOD CAUSE DOES NOT EXIST THAT WOULD JUSTIFY A
NUNC PRO TUNC ORDER MODIFYING THE DIVORCE DECREE TO ELIMINATE
ALIMONY EITHER BASED UPON THE ALLEGED STIPULATION OF
NOVEMBER 28, 1973; OR ANY OTHER EVENT SINCE THAT TIME.
If this Court were to accept Appellants statement of facts
-6-

as undisputed, there would still be no basis for any Court to
issue a nunc pro tunc order terminating alimony under the statutory
provisions of § 30-4a-l of the Utah Code Annotated (1953) as
amended or under the ruling of Home v. Home, 737 P. 2d 244 (Utah
App. 1987) which has interpreted the statute.
The nunc pro tunc statute is significant, primarily because
it changes the old common law rule that a nunc pro tunc order
could only be entered when errors could be corrected or omissions
supplied where a complete and signed agreement had been reached,
or a signed order completely made. [See Preece v. Preece, 682
P.2d 298, 299 (Utah 1984)]

The focus of the common law rule was

to prevent nunc pro tunc orders where substantive issues remained
to be resolved

and were nut resolved, at the time a particular

order was sought to be entered.

At common law, the presence of a

signed agreement or order was viewed as a evidence of finality
where a Court would not be required to go back and attempt to
determine the intent of the parties.
When the Utah State Legislature passed the provisions of
§ 30-4a-l in 1984, it substituted "good cause" as a standard that
could overcome the common law rule that a signed agreement or
order was required to make the record speak the truth.

While the

statute did, indeed, give broader discretion to Courts in the use
of nunc pro tunc orders in matters related to marriage, it did
not alter the focus of a nunc pro tunc order to enter now, what
previously had been made.

This Court in Home pointed out that

"Statutes are not to be construed as effecting any change in the
-7-

common law beyond which is clearly indicated [Home at 248,
emphasis added].

In this instance, the common law requirement of

a signed order or stipulation was replaced with the standard of
good cause, which would allow a Court to enter an order where an
agreement or order had not been signed, but the where intent of the
parties was obvious and a nunc pro tunc order was justified to
avoid manifest injustice.

No other aspect of the old common law

rule was changed.
Under both the common law rule and the statutory rule there
is no room for a court to substitute its substantive opinion of the
intent of parties where there is no factual basis to support such
findings.

The substance of an agreement must be undisputable.

The focus of a court under the statutory rule, as under the common
law rule, remains procedural; to correct obvious errors and
omissions to avoid obvious injustice.

In Home, this Court gave

substantial deference to the legislative intent that preceded the
statute, citing several examples made by Rep. Lorin Pace during
the 3rd reading of House Bill 218 which ultimately became § 304a-l.

In each example cited by Rep. Pace, the instance of injustice

focused on procedural errors and omissions [Home at 248].
In the facts at bar, the required good cause does not exist
that would have justified the Court below in issuing a nunc pro
tunc order as prayed by Defendant.

There is no question that the

Court would have been required to make substantive presumptions
if it had attempted to enter a nunc pro tunc order as prayed for
by Appellant.

Not only was there no signed agreement as required
-8-

by the old rule, there.was not even a draft of a proposed agreement
or order.

All the court had to rely on, knowing that Respondent

was not at the meeting the day the alleged agreement took place,
was the self-serving testimony of Appellant, which on its face
does not appear to be anything other than a subjective cry of
foul from a man who has only had to pay child support and alimony
when forced to by the State of Utah,
Appellant states that he agreed to drop charges of theft of
his jeep and a federal income tax return as consideration for the
agreement to drop alimony.

While the assertion may have some

remote resemblance to reasonableness on its face, when viewed
under the totality of circumstances, it is, in fact, illusory.
The Title to the jeep was in Respondent's name whiirh allowed her
to sell it; the income tax return was also made out in her name,
along with her ex-husband.

While nothing justifies her violation

of the decree which awards the jeep to her husband, and nothing
justified her signing his name to the check, the failure of
Appellant to meet any of his obligations under the decree prior
to the alleged agreement on November 28, 1973 had given rise to
substantial claims in favor of Respondent that would have more
than offset his claims against her had the issues been tried.
What benefit was she receiving in turn for her agreement to drop
alimony?

If anything, she was forfeiting more than she could

possibly have lost at trial, just for the privilege of giving up
alimony and avoiding the threats made over the jeep and federal
check.

These facts as purported by Appellant, at close scrutiny,
-9-

lack any logical basis to support his conclusions.
In adopting a new standard of "good cause" as the statutory
basis for nunc pro tunc, the legislature eliminated the old rule
that prevented such an order where no signed order or agreement
existed, even in the face of obvious injustice where no substantive
dispute existed between parties and their intent was indisputable.
When a nunc pro tunc order was prevented under the old
common law rule, where good cause existed, the intent of parties
was clear and the injustice was blatant, simply because an order
or agreement was not signed through procedural error, the lament
of great legal minds has been shrill.

Indeed, this Court in

Home cited to one of the more famous quotes of Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes paraphrased by Justice Crockett in his dissent to
Daly v. Daly, 533 P.2d 884, 887 (Utah, 1975) as follows:
There is nothing more revolting to one's sense of
justice than to have it asserted that something must be
done that way because it was so laid down in the reign
of Henry IV; and it is even more so, if whatever reason
for doing it that way has long since vanished.
Obviously, under the old rule, the requirement of a signature
to an order or agreement insured that a nunc pro tunc order did
not involve substantive revisions or impositions by a court in
making such an order.

Though the old rule was effective in

preventing a court from substituting its own judgment for that of
the parties, it still prevented courts from making equitable
changes where the intent of parties was absolutely clear but no
signed order or agreement was present.

By adopting the standard

of "good cause", the legislature provided the needed statutory
-10-

relief that gave courts wider discretion to prevent "obvious
injustices" [Home at 248, emphasis added].

In Home, after

clearly enunciating the contrast between the common law rule and
statutory requirements for nunc pro tunc orders, This Court
reversed the trial Court's entry of a nunc pro tunc order because
the nunc pro tunc order did not conform to the expressed language
of the parties as had been read into the record, and eliminated
any references to the tax consequences of property distribution
under the divorce decree.

This Court set aside the nunc pro tunc

order, stating:
. . . the court either misunderstood the how critical
the tax language was to the parties1 agreement or
substituted its own judgment for that of the parties,
and it misused its nunc pro tunc powers to accomplish
that aim. [Horne, at 249]
Accordingly, though courts now have wider discretionary
powers to enter nunc pro tunc orders, such discretion does not include
substantive changes that require a court to substitute its judgment
for that of the parties.

The new standard of "good cause" still

requires that its meaning be determined on a case by case basis,
in light of all the surrounding circumstances, as equity and
justice require [Id. at 248]. The intent of the parties must be
clear, and the order must be used to correct obvious injustice.
In the case at bar, Appellant cries injustice at having to
pay 8 years of arrearages under the decree, which is all that the
Respondent was legally able to pursue.

In this instance, Appellant

has confused injustice with inconvenience.
Injustice is having a valid decree where a party has refused
-11-

to obey a lawful court order with impunity, knowing that his exwife does not have the resources to chase him through court to
enforce the order.

Injustice is asserting detrimental reliance

on purported agreement where nothing was given up in order to
claim a substantial financial windfall.

Injustice is playing

dumb under the pretext of illiteracy when ample resources and
time were, and are, available to insure that individuals are
represented, and rights are protected.

Injustice is relying on

years of ignorant bliss as a basis for asserting a self-serving
version of a purported agreement should replace a valid and
enforceable decree, especially where a person has had ample time
and resources to seek proper redress from an unjust decree, if in
fact it is unjust.
Clearly, the Court below was correct in its inability to
find good cause that would justify a nunc pro tunc order in this
matter.

POINT NO. 2: THE COURT'S RULING IN LIGHT OF BROWN V. BROWN
IS CORRECT, AND NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THE PROVISIONS OF
§ 30-4A-1 OF THE UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1953) AS AMENDED.
In the Minute Entry of August 4, 1988 (Record, Page 89) and
the subsequent Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered by
the Trial Court (Record, Page 135), substantial emphasis is
placed on the ruling in Brown v. Brown, 744 P.2d 333 (Utah App.
1987) as the basis of its decision in favor of Respondent.
Brown was handed down by this Court on October 21, 1987,
approximately 5 months after its decision in Home.
-12-

The rule of

law established in Brown is best stated in the Courtfs citation
to 73 Am.Jur.2d Stipulations § 2 (1974) wherein it states:
. . . unless it is clear from the record that the
parties assented, there is no stipulation, and it is
provided in many jurisdictions, by rule of court or by
statute, that a private agreement or consent between
the parties or their attorneys, in respect to the
proceedings in a cause, will not be enforced by the
court unless it is evidenced by a writing subscribed by
a party against whom it is alleged or made, and filed
by the clerk or entered upon the minutes of the court.
Any other rule would require the court to pass upon the
credibility of the attorneys.
This Court goes on to cite the Utah Rules of Practice in District
and Circuit Court and their conformity to the Statute of Frauds
as further support for the stated requirements of a stipulation.
At first blush, the ruling in Brown seems to contradict the
ruling in Home, and the elimination of a required signature in
Home may have become a red herring that the Appellant would have
us chase into the rationale of Brown.

A closer look, however,

reveals that the two cases are consistent, if not complimentary.
In Home, the discretionary powers of a court to enter a nunc pro
tunc order to correct procedural errors and omissions are widened,
while in Brown, the standards for assessing the substantive
agreement between parties is clarified.
Like the case at bar, Brown involves a dispute over -in
alleged agreement that took place at a meeting between the parties
and their counsel.

Unlike this case, however, both parties in

Brown were present, the alleged stipulation was recorded by a
court reporter, and a written stipulation was sent to counsel for
signature of the parties.

This Court in Brown reversed the trial
-13-

court's order modifying the decree to conform to the agreement as
it appeared on the court reporter's transcript and the proposed
agreement because the putative stipulation was not evidenced by a
writing subscribed by the parties or made orally in open court
where a judge would have been involved and likely would have made
inquiry of both parties.
Could the trial court have modified the decree in Brown
without such a signature under a Home nunc pro tunc order?
The answer is obviously no, in light of all the circumstances.
The key to understanding the procedural discretion of Home in
light of the apparent procedural restrictions imposed in Brown
lies in this Court's concern for substantive agreement.
A nunc pro tunc order cannot make a past record speak the
truth unless the modification is, indeed the truth.

The concern

of this Court in Brown, and Home as well, is to determine the
actual intent of the parties, without the imposition of a trial
court's judgment on substantive issues.

In Brown, this Court

addresses the issue of substantive agreement by focusing on the
common law and statutory requirements of a stipulation.
Basic to a valid stipulation is a meeting of the minds
of those involved. The parties must have completed
their negotiations in person or through their attorneys
acting within the rules of agency. The agreement then
is reduced to writing, signed and filed with the clerk
or read into the record before the court. [Brown at 335]
Though the ruling in Brown does not necessarily define or
limit what constitutes "good cause" to modify an order nunc pro
tunc, it does establish the standard by which all substantive
agreements, in nunc pro tunc cases and otherwise, will be viewed
-14-

to determine the intent of the parties.
In essence, the primary issue before this Court in the case
at bar is whether or not the parties entered into an enforceable
stipulation that would justify a nunc pro tunc ordei fn modify
the decree.

Basic to that issue is whether or not there was a

meeting of the minds between the parties.

The record clearly

indicates there was not.
In spite of Appellant's assertions about what constitutes good
cause and how his rights have been impaired by the strict imposition
of procedural requirements in Brown, all of which seem to trail
through Appellant's brief like a knight in search of the Holy
Grail, the one issue that Appellant has not, and cannot overcome,
is the fact that there was no meeting of the minds on November
28, 1973, nor has there been since that time.
In spite of Plaintiff/Appellantfs representation to the
contrary, (Testimony of Wanda Bagshaw, Page 21 - Addendum Exhibit
"F"), Appellant would have the Court believe that there really
was r\ meeting of the minds based upon his version of the November
28, 1973 meeting, and upon a minute entry (Record, Page 23) that
purports to verify such a meeting of the minds because "the
alimony was the primary contention of the parties" (Appellant's
Brief, Page 14). Since the minute entry makes reference to a
pending stipulation, and since Appellant would never had agreed
to continue alimony, the reference to a "pending stipulation"
must mean that Respondent agreed to the demands of her ex-husband,
even though she testified she never agreed, nor authorized her
-15-

attorney to agree.

Obviously such reasoning is wholly without

merit, and is as far from "good cause" as it can get.
Whether or not Rule 4.5(b) of the Utah Rules of Practice
were in effect in 1973, the Statute of Frauds provisions found at
§ 25-5-4 of the Utah Code Annotated (1953) as amended, had been
in effect in substantially the same form for almost a century.
Here, the Appellant would have us modify a decree based upon his
representations of an oral agreement that purportedly took place
15 years ago! [emphasis added]

This is exactly the type of

situation that the Statute of Frauds has intended to avoid since
its earliest inception in our common law heritage.
In short, the principles set forth in Brown have been applied
correctly to the case at bar.

There was no meeting of the minds

between the parties on November 28, 1973; nor has there been
since.

There is no testimony in the record that can reasonably

infer that a meeting of the minds took place.

There is no writing

or record before the Court that specifies the substantive agreement,
if any, that was purportedly reached on November 28, 1973.

The

Court below had no choice but to rule that an enforceable stipulation
had not, and has not taken place so as to justify a nunc pro tunc
order modifying a valid decree in this matter.

POINT NO. 3:

RESPONDENT SHOULD BE AWARDED COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S
FEES INCURRED IN THIS APPEAL.

There is ample evidence in this matter that Respondent has
been, and continues to be, financially unable to bear the cost of
enforcing her rights under the decree.
-16-

At the outset of the

divorce, Respondent was required to sign an affidavit of impecuniosi
to have the complaint served (Record, Page 5); she testified at
the hearing in this matter in July 1988, that she sold the jeep
and took the check in 1973 because of Appellant's refusal to give
her any money under the decree (Testimony of Wanda Bagshaw, Page
21-23); she testified that she was on welfare until 1981, and had
to return to welfare briefly in 1984 (Id. at 17); and th-if -.IIH
has made approximately $4.00 per hour since going off assistance
in 1985 (Id. at Page 25).
Throughout the period of time since the decree was entered
in 1973, Respondent has never received child support payments or
alimony payments from Appellant (Id. Page 18); and even though
she has received a judgment in the amount of $19,400 from the
Court below, it still represents substantially less than what she
would have received had Appellant paid alimony as required by the
decree.

In short, Appellant has ignored the Court order in this

matter for over 15 years, knowing that Respondents financial
position, compounded by his refusal to provide any support to her
at all, severely limited her ability to pursue Appellant through
Court to enforce the decree.
Counsel for Respondent has testified, without objection from
counsel for Appellant, that his fees are reasonable and within
the prevailing rate in Salt Lake City (Id. at Pages 39-40) and
pursuant to the affidavit of counsel (Addendum Exhibit "P")
Respondent has at the time of filing this brief, incurred costs
and fees of approximately $4,200 based on over 40 hours of research,
-17-

drafting and preparation for this appeal which was necessary to
preserve Respondent's judgment.

This Court is justified in

awarding attorney's fees and costs because the need for such
award has been supported by the evidence in this matter, the
hourly billing rate is clearly within the prevailing rate in Salt
Lake City, and Respondent's need is more than reasonable in light
of all the facts in this case [Newmeyer v. Newmeyer/ 745 P.2d 1276
(Utah 1987); see also Huck v. Huck, 734 P.2d 417, 419 (Utah
1986); and Beals v. Beals, 682 P.2d 862 (Utah 1984)].

CONCLUSION
The Court below in this appeal was correct in awarding
Respondent a judgment in the amount of $19,400 for alimony due
under the decree that was entered herein on January 10, 1973.
Appellant has not, and cannot, show good cause for a nunc pro
tunc order modifying the decree as of November 28, 1973, because
there was never a meeting of the minds with regard to such meeting.
The omissions and errors following the November 28, 1973, if any
do exist, would go far beyond simple procedural error, and would
require substantive interference by a court in order to accomplish
what Appellant seeks in this appeal.

Further, there is no written

record, no oral record made before the court, and no signed
stipulation that would make such an alleged agreement enforceable
in light of the Statute of Frauds and the rule set down in Brown.
Finally, the record clearly shows all of the elements necessary
to find that Respondent is entitled to, and should be awarded,
-18-

costs

and attorney's fees incurred in this appeal.
, 1989.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3rd day of

JOI^ SPENCER SNOW
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent

Certificate of Delivery
I hereby certify that I caused to be delivered 4 true and
correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Respondent to Randall
Gaither, Esq., Attorney for Defendant/Appellant, at 321 South 600
East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, this.
, 1989.
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ADDENDUM
The text of § 25-5-4 of the Utah Code Annotated (1953) as amended,
is as follows:
25-5-4. Certain agreements void unless written and subscribed.
In the following cases every agreement shall be void unless such
agreement, or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing
subscribed by the party to be charged therewith:
(1) Every agreement that by its terms is not to be performed
within one year from the making thereof.
(2) Every promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage
of another.
(3) Every agreement, promise or undertaking made upon
consideration of marriage, except mutual promises to marry.
(4) Every special promise made by an executor or administrator
to answer in damages for the liabilities, or to pay the debts, of
the testator or intestate out of his own estate.
(5) Every agreement authorizing or employing an agent or
broker to purchase or sell real estate for compensation.
The text of § 30-4a-l of the Utah Code Annotated (1953) as amended,
is as follows:
30-4a-l. Authority of court. A court having jurisdiction may,
upon its finding of good cause and giving of such notice as may
be ordered, enter an order nunc pro tunc in a matter relating to
marriage, divorce, legal separation or annulment of marriage.

-20-

8
1

it

decree of divorce by the Court?

2

f£)

3

cy

4

your own personal knowledge about his ability to read

5

and write?

6

No.
Okay.

Now, with regard to Mr. Bagshaw, what is

Well, he's always signed papers when we've bought

7

things.

8

that he read.

9

he used to write to me when he was in the service.

He used to have a subscription to the Outdoor Life
He used to read all the proclamations and

10

Q

11

is to pay medical and dental expenses, that is, if there

12

are any.

13

by insurance?

14

A

15

(Qy

16

19

22
23
24
25

No.
Have you ever verbally agreed either with your

provision?
(A)

/Qy

20
21

Did he pay anything at all that was not covered

attorney, Mr. Bagshaw, or anyone, to waive that alimony

17
18

In regard to your divorce decree, it also provides he

NO.

Did you ever authorize Mr. Haycock to enter into

negotiations to terminate alimony for you?
/(h/

No.

A?)

In regard to your subsequent - - t o your divorce

decree and after it was entered by the Court, did you make
any appearances in court on the decree, other than the one
time you mentioned in November of 1973?
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SPENCER L. HAYCOCK
Attorney for p l a i n t i f f
731 E a s t South Temple
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84102
Telephone:
322-3551

JAN 10 1973
'^-m-v r s r f -

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY

..r C -

STATE OF UTAH

/

*

WANDA MARIE SACKETT BAGSHAW,
Plaintiff,

APPEARANCE AND WAIVER

-vs-

Civil No. (/>

JOSEPH ARTHUR BAGSHAW,

/J7f

Defendant.

COMES NOW Joseph Arthur Bagshaw, Defendant in the above
entitled case, and acknowledges the receipt of a copy of the
Plaintiff's Complaint on file herein, and waives time in which to
plead or otherwise answer said Complaint and agrees that the
Plaintiff may apply to the Court for a default at any time without
further notice.
DATED this "i 5 ,tday of November, 1972.

/Zf-'

JOSEPH ARTHUR BAGSHAW/" Defendant
STATE OF UTAH
ss.
County of Salt Lake )
On this

jrVb. ^ a Y of November', 1972, personally appeared

before me JOSEPH ARTHUR BAGSHAW, the signer of the foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

ling

My Commission Expires:

•ciiJi* LieJeG Con

*fey, Utah

/

o
I
THE COURT:

1
2

I

Mr. Bagshaw, I ? m going tc ask you, please,

to scoot up close to the mike. Speak right into it so we can

3 hear you.
4

THE WITNESS:

Yes.

I was in St. George at the time

5

and we talked on the phone and at that time she had said

6

all she wanted was a quick divorce and child support and that

7

was it and the furniture in our trailer house that we had

8

down in St. George, and I says, "Yes, you can have it all,"

9

and I says, "You 1 11 have to mark on it or tell me where to

10

sign," and so she did and that's what'I did.

11

she told me to sign on the paper.

12 Q

I signed where

And after the signing, did you deliver that paper to

13 her?
14 A

No, it was sent back to her, but with a mailing, you

15 know, an envelope that she had filled out and I just sent it
16

to her, you know,

17 Q

What was your

by putting stamps on it.
understanding at the time concerning

13 the Divorce decree and alimony, if any?
19

A

20

form.

21

Q

22

future information that maybe the divorce decree provided

23

for alimony?

24 A

There was nothing said about alimony in any way or

Did there come to your attention sometime in the

Yes.

25 divorce.

My brother had read it to me.

It was after the

He had said, "Hey, do you know that you are paying

14

£
*
1

A

Yes.

2

Q

And when did you go to court?

3

A

On November 28th

4

U>

5
6

\3

i

of '73.

You were present in court on that day?
I met with the lawyers in the hall and then I was

dismissed.

7

Q

Did you receive a later phone call that day?

8

A

Yes.

9

o

And Mr. Havcock called vou ur> from the court?

10 f A }

Well, I don't know if he was at court.

I think he

11

was home because I called him.

12

Q

13

Defendant's Exhibit Number 1 and ask if you can identify

14

the signature on this document, which we'll call for

15

purposes of the record the assignment of collection of

16

support payments.

17

A

That's my signature.

18

Q

Did you sign it about the time it's dated, January

19

the 10th, 1972?

20

A

Uh-huh (affirmative).

21

Q

Did you leave the original of this document with the

22

Office of Recovery Services?

23

A

24
25

I'm going to show you what's been marked as

Yes.
MR. GAITHER:

At this time I would offer Defendant's

Exhibit Number 1.
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
WANDA MARIE SACKETT BAGSHAW,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.

AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL
: Case No. 880647-CA
:

JOSEPH ARTHUR BAGSHAW

:

Defendant/Appellant.
STATE OF UTAH

Priority Classification
No. 14b

:

)
ss.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
JOHN SPENCER SNOW, first duly sworn upon his oath, deposes
and states as follows:
1.

That he is counsel for Respondent in the above-captioned

matter;
2.

That the matters testified to herein are based upon his

own personal knowledge;
3.

That it was necessary to expend approximately 42 hours

to research issues, draft arguments and prepare the Respondents
Brief in this appeal as of the time of filing Respondents brief;
4.

That since the trial in this matter, the affiant has

raised his legal fees to $100 per hour, which rates are commensurate
with rates normally found for such legal services in Salt Lake
City, Utah;
5.

That Respondent has incurred approximately $4,200 in

fees in responding to this Appeal;
6.

That in the legal opinion of the Affiant, Respondent's

incurring of such fees was necessary to preserve her judgment

7.

That the Respondent is not capable of paying all of her

fees without incurring substantial financial hardship on herself;
8.

That Respondent is in need of an order from this Court

awarding costs and attorney's fees incurred as of the date of the
decision in this appeal.
9.

Further, the affiant sayeth naught.

DATED this 3*4 day of

JtY\*r*4

, 1989

JOHN^SPENCE^SNOW
Attorney for Respondent
J^

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this
n)drcl

, 1989.

NOTARY
FUtSLlCyO
)TARYPUBLIC>o

* <b

Residing atr/C^^/t^My Commission Expires
Seal

day of

